World-China Forum

It is China that holds the key to North Korea

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is taking advantage of Beijing’s desire for stability on the Korean peninsula by engaging in provocative actions that could permanently alter the north-east Asian security situation. Mr Kim’s moves are calculated – they are designed to help secure a dynastic succession and North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapons power. Fearful of a flood of refugees should Mr Kim’s regime implode, China has responded cautiously. Beijing apparently still believes that its national interests are best served by a weak North Korean regime that is dependent on China.

The new nuclear and missile tests are just part of a series of provocative moves by Pyongyang this spring, but even by North Korean standards Mr Kim’s actions since April are outrageous. Yet China’s response has been very restrained. It argues that the best option for stability in North Korea is a smooth transition of power. It therefore is hesitant about supporting sanctions that really bite, such as cutting the supply of oil and coal, which would cripple the dysfunctional North Korean economy. True, such measures could destabilise the regime. But tough, targeted sanctions may get North Korea back to the negotiating table if done with a clear offer of resuming the principles of reciprocal action embedded in the February 2007 agreement. North Korea is not Iran. It does not have oil and gas to sell to get around sanctions. If left unchecked, surely Pyongyang will try to define a new reality that allows it to maintain nuclear weapons. Which is more destabilising: instability in succession or North Korea seeking to redefine the nuclear status of the Korean peninsula? That is the real question of instability before China.

Why is China so careful? It is partly the product of its historically strained relations with Mr Kim and worries that it may be embarrassed if it presses him without success. But Beijing also appears to have decided that the best chance of stability in North Korea lies in another hereditary transfer of power. By muting criticism of Pyongyang’s actions the Chinese are sending any contenders for power a strong message that China supports the current power arrangements. (Dennis Wilder, Financial Times)

North Korea and the Chinese Giant

North Korea’s nuclear ambitions clearly have high stakes for China, and the question now is not whether China will actively seek to rein in the North’s behavior, but rather, how it will do so.

China has demonstrated over the past few weeks its growing impatience with the North’s behavior and its readiness to take punitive measures against its communist ally. Reports from the United Nations indicate that China is receptive to U.S. calls for sanctions to punish the DPRK for its recent behavior. Beijing played a crucial role in bringing Pyongyang back to the negotiating table following the October 2006 nuclear test, and the United States is again looking to China to be a constructive partner in resolving the crisis.

But a healthy dose of caution must accompany this optimistic development. China’s chief endgame is stability, not the denuclearization of North Korea, and it is unlikely that China would take any actions that it believes would cause the regime to collapse or instigate it to escalate the situation further.

China will continue to be cautious and restrained in its actions, just as it has called for other nations to remain “cool-headed.” What we will likely see as the crisis unfolds is a China that is much more vocal in its opposition to North Korea’s nuclear and military programs and more disposed to participating in multilateral condemnations and economic sanctions against North Korea, but strongly opposed to military responses, such as bolstering of bilateral U.S.-Japan and South Korea relations. (Winny Chen, Center for American Progress)

DPRK's moves driven by inner urge to power

There used to be a so-called card-playing theory about the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue. Advocates of such a theory believed the DPRK was not actually developing nuclear weapons. Instead, it was showing its nuclear prowess as a trump card to draw the attention of the US and the international community and using it as a bargaining chip for negotiations.

But as Pyongyang unfolded its confrontationist moves, suspicions grew over whether the DPRK was only indulging in gimmicks. The fact that the country has conducted a new nuclear test after its withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks proves the "card-playing theory" to be wrong: The DPRK was not simply bluffing; it has actually been developing nuclear weapons.

This has given rise to a new explanation by some Chinese academics: that the latest steps taken by the DPRK have something to do with its domestic political situation. Some academics believe, the current leadership is determined to shoulder the heavy responsibility of accomplishing the major tasks facing the DPRK to become a "strong and prosperous nation" before handing over charge to the next generation. This is part of the current leadership's effort to fulfill its "historic mission".

Among the major tasks could be to: 1) Turn the DPRK into a truly nuclear state. For nuclear weapons are a symbol of national strength and the hallmark of "a strong and prosperous nation". It also reflects the country's long-held policy of "giving top priority to the military". 2) Equip the country with mature short-, medium- and long-range missile technologies. This will maximize the strike capability of nuclear weapons and plunge "the enemies into trepidation". 3) Re-demarcate the marine border - between the DPRK and ROK on waters off the west coast of the Peninsula - as was formed after the 1953 Korean War truce was signed. 4) Push forward the cause of national reunification.

None of these tasks can be achieved by the DPRK without showing creativity and courage in dealing with the international community and international laws while racing against time. This could explain why the DPRK, with a sense of urgency, has resorted to a series of daring acts within such a short span of time. If the hypothesis holds, the development of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, and even in East Asia, is worrying and fraught with the risk of going out of control. (Zhang Liangui, China Daily)

Why isolate a global pariah even further?

On the question of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, better known as (a) North Korea, (b) notorious charter member of former U.S. President George W. Bush's "axis of evil" and (c) pain-in-the-neck threat to world peace and stability, here are a few humble observations in light of the fact that, basically, no one really knows what to do about North Korea, including China.

You would think that China, the originator of the six-party talks (aimed at North Korean nuclear disarmament and begun in 2003) would be embarrassed by the latest morose turn of events. But China, Pyongyang's longtime ally, is not totally hapless. All along, it has said the North Korea is such an enfant terrible that even China cannot really control it. And Beijing's greatest fear is not the missiles but the potentially massive migrant population if North Korea collapses. China prefers the company of secure, sealed, unthreatening buffer states. Given its common border with North Korea, it is much opposed to instability, whatever the nature of that regime.

Calls from the West to isolate it further are like asking to further isolate the planet Pluto from Uranus. What's the point? Besides, isolation as a policy doesn't work, if what you want is regime amelioration or even change. If it is outright regime change you prefer, consider trying something different. Consider aggressive, near-reckless engagement. What is there to lose? Better to execute an approach favored by the bold campaigner Barack Obama — not the waffling President Obama — and run circles around the North Koreans with an embarrassment of recognition and riches: Drop the embargo, establish a U.S. Embassy in Pyongyang (we have no official representation there now), fatten the regime up with aid, accumulate leverage, change the behavior, establish regional peace. Try to be subtle, indirect and smart for once. (Tom PLate, Japan Times)

Kim Jong-il is a headache, but not a nightmare

North Korea is a big problem. With nuclear weapons it would become an even bigger one. But, unlike Iran, it does not keep me awake at night. Iran wants to be the major power in the Gulf. Its neighbours, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, see it is a direct threat to their safety and security. Iran's threats to annihilate Israel, combined with its aspirations for nuclear weapons, could be a precursor to a major war with massive casualties throughout the Middle East.

North Korea is in a different league. It cannot be the new regional power in the Far East. The very thought is ludicrous. It is desperately poor; its economy is puny compared to South Korea's, and both China and Japan tower over it. A nuclear-armed North Korea would be dangerous but, because of its poverty and relative insignificance, it would be a different kind of danger.

North Korea and its dictator, Kim Jong-il, are like the disturbed individual with a gun and several hostages who has been cornered in a house by the police. The damage he could do is serious but is limited to those closest to him. He could be killed by the police, at any time, but that might endanger the hostages and there could be other repercussions. The challenge is to manage the incident and try to conclude it without casualties and without damaging side effects.

Economic sanctions and the threat of a total blockade could destroy what is left of the North Korean economy and threaten the survival of the regime without too much difficulty. The consequences, however, could be highly destabilising for the whole region. (Malcolm Rifkind, Telegraph)

Why China Won't Do More With North Korea

Reading all the stuff about North Korea's nukes, one thing strikes me: the United States seems to want to outsource not just its jobs to China, but also its diplomacy. "It's up to China!" and "China can do more!" are the operative phrases emerging from DC-think-tanks and the US government. As if....

Here's where those easy exhortations break down and why I think it's naïve of us to expect that China can "do more," or in the words of John Bolton, "end this thing tomorrow."

There's a silly assumption in Washington that our interests (no nukes in North Korea) are the same as China's. But they're not. China's first interest in North Korea is making sure the Kim regime doesn't collapse. China's second interest? Making sure the Kim regime doesn't collapse. From Beijing's perspective, nukes in North Korea rank somewhere around 10th.

For decades the United States has assumed that it could mold China into an ally. We had limited success in yanking China into our battle with the Soviet Union. But an exception doesn't prove the rule. There's a lot of hyperventilating in Washington these days about the "G2" and about how the United States and China together will solve the world's problems. On the Korean peninsula - the very peninsula where China and the United States fought a nasty war 59 years ago - those assumptions have run aground. We can't outsource the solution to North Korea's nukes to China because China views its interests a lot differently than we do. Sure, China would rather not see Pyongyang have the bomb. But if given the choice between a nuclear-armed North Korea and no North Korea at all, Beijing will go with the former. (John Pomfrey, Washington Post)

The North Korea Conundrum

Realistically, North Korea's belligerence looks like a problem that can’t be solved. Instead, we’re going to have to try to manage it -- minimizing the harm North Korea can do while acknowledging that a lasting solution is unlikely to emerge until there’s a change of leadership in Pyongyang.  More aggressive strategies, like urging sharply punitive economic measures from China, seem likely to do more harm than good. The reason is that the complete failure of the North Korean state would pose too many difficult questions in terms of how to cope with the ensuing flows of refugees. Then there's the reality that South Korea's economy would likely sink if it had to take responsibility for the North. The military options against North Korea also don't look remotely appealing. For one thing, you can't bomb the engineering knowledge North Korea has obtained. More fundamentally, the problem with military action against North Korea remains the fact that Seoul is within artillery range of North Korean forces. A war, in other words, could lead to one of the world's largest cities being effectively destroyed.

That's not to say there's nothing we can do about the North Korea problem. Diplomacy must be continued.-----As for the North Korean endgame, it's not clear what we can do. Ultimately, the United States -- along with South Korea, China, and Japan -- needs to start thinking more seriously about the possibility of a North Korean collapse. Pyongyang's political and economic systems are unsustainable, and the country's aggressive behavior is alienating all potential friends and making things worse. Meanwhile, one reason it's so difficult to respond effectively to North Korean provocations is that its enemies are almost as afraid of its collapse as its leaders are. As of now, nobody's prepared for what would happen when the waiting ends, making the situation even harder to manage, let alone solve. The fact that there are no good answers to either the North's nukes or its potential collapse tends to encourage people to just focus attention on other things. But ignoring the problem doesn't make it go away, and delaying efforts to think about it makes things worse. (Matthew Yglesias, American Prospect)

What if Obama has no body to engage?

The series of threats from the North Korea has been without precedent in its swiftness and has not been a response to any U.S. action, says Cha, indicating that regime insiders are trying to outdo each other in demonstrating their hardline credentials. Whereas in 2006 the nuclear standoff was resolved in part because of Chinese contacts with the North, now "maybe the Chinese don't know who to talk to," says Victor Cha, a North Korea expert at Georgetown who served on George W. Bush's second-term National Security Councils. (Michael Hirsh, Newsweek)

The Key to Reining In North Korea? It’s China…

China is the key to stopping North Korea’s nuclear bomb development and proliferation activities. Just as Obama must cajole Beijing into supporting tough sanctions against another nuclear proliferation wanna-be –- the Islamic Republic of Iran –- the administration must persuade China to do what it has so far resisted –- tell North Korea to cease and desist its nuclear bomb program and implement the pledges it has made and repeatedly broken to dismantle its programs.

Make no mistake about it:  China must now act. It supplies between 80-90 percent of North Korea’s power, 90 percent of its crude oil and all of its diesel fuel. Between 70 and 80 percent of North Korea’s food imports come through China. And while ailing autocrat Kim Jong Il clearly doesn’t care if his people starve, he might care if China nixes his apparent plans, as reported in The Wall Street Journal, to have his brother-in-law and third son succeed him.

Thus, since there seems to be no viable military alternative to diplomacy, the Obama administration should play the card it might have –  China. Beijing can command North Korea’s attention in a way that Washington cannot. To date, China has been reluctant to punish North Korea, fearful that the ugly regime might collapse and cause chaos or reunify with South Korea. But with so much at stake, Obama must see who our true nonproliferation friends are. (Judith Miller, Fox Forum)

North Korea Poses No Real Threat to the World

Q: Do you think North Korea poses a real threat or is it just a political game that they are playing?

A: I am a little different from some observers, because I think the threat is very small. North Korea lacks the industrial capacity to build large numbers of long-ranged missiles. They will not be able to build so many weapons as to become a strategic factor in the region. But I have to acknowledge that they do pose a threat to South Korea both through short-range missiles, and the possibility of using the nuclear weapons in the South, even though there are just a few, or artillery from the North to the South. That would be the end of the North regime if they were to attack the South, but they still have that capacity. Moreover, they may force the Japanese to reconsider their very modest defense program. The Japanese have the capacity to move to a nuclear weapon, I do not think they will, but they certainly can. Certainly, politically Japan will debate whether or not move to a nuclear weapon in the short term because of this development in North Korea. And they do feel threatened by the North Korean short-ranged missiles and nuclear weapon. But as I said, North Korea is an industrial midget and not really in a position to pose a large-scale threat to the neighborhood. (Douglas H. Paal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)